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Executive Summary
Soil erosion poses a serious threat to agricultural 
production in developing countries, especially in 
regions such as the Andes, where soil erosion is 
widespread and affects the livelihoods of farm 
households. Despite considerable program efforts 
to promote soil conservation practices among farm 
households, the uptake is often disappointing. 
Often these practices are not cost-efficient for the 
farm households. To counteract the lack of bene­
fits, natural resource management programs inter­
vene by providing households with direct incentives 
to promote soil conservation practices. The use of 
direct incentives is criticized, however, because 
farm households tend to abandon soil conservation 
practices once the program withdraws its assistance. 
The situation in the Andes is further complicated 
by the limited productivity of agriculture and by 
market failures. As a result, farm households have 
little interest in investing in agriculture. Although 
soil conservation practices have the potential to 
increase agricultural productivity, farm households 
cannot convert these benefits into income, and this 
situation explains farm households' resistance to 
these practices.
In this case study, the main stakeholders are the 
users of the land—that is, the farm households— 
and the society (represented by the government]. 
Two government programs, PRONAMACHCS and 
MARENASS, are promoting soil conservation prac­
tices throughout the Andes. These programs are 
not sufficient, however, to guarantee sustainable 
natural resource management, and they should be 
supported with agricultural or development poli­
cies. Several policy options are being considered to 
improve rural livelihoods and promote natural 
resource protection.
Your assignment is to design a policy for natural 
resource protection in the Peruvian Andes, focus­
ing on soil conservation in particular, within a rural 
development strategy.
Background
Agricultural production is essential for the liveli­
hoods of many farm households in developing 
countries. Because these farm households often 
have limited means to increase production through 
artificial inputs, soil productivity determines
potential crop production. Thus soil forms an 
essential input for the livelihoods of farm house­
holds in developing countries.
On-Site Impacts of Soil Erosion
When the rainfall intensity or irrigation rate 
exceeds the infiltration capacity of the soil on 
sloping farmland, the excess water runs off the land 
and three processes that affect agricultural produc­
tion begin: water is lost; seeds and fertilizers may 
be lost as they are carried away by the runoff 
water; and soil erosion takes place. The first two 
processes have a direct negative effect on crop 
growth. The third process has a less visible effect 
on agricultural production but is nevertheless 
detrimental. Soil erosion decreases the productivity 
of the soil as soil fertility, soil depth, and water 
storage capacity are reduced and the soil structure 
is degraded. Soil erosion induced by inappropriate 
farming practices is thus considered a major con­
straint to agricultural development in developing 
countries, and consequently a constraint to rural 
development and poverty reduction (Ellis-Jones 
1999], It is estimated that each year 75 billion 
metric tons of soil are removed from land world­
wide by erosion, resulting in the destruction and 
abandonment of 12 million hectares of arable land 
annually, a loss that poses a threat to food security 
[Pimentel et al. 1995],
Off-Site Impacts of Soil Erosion
Soil erosion can also have serious off-site impacts if 
the eroded soil particles are carried off-site by 
overland water flows and deposited elsewhere. 
These off-site impacts include negative effects such 
as pollution of rivers, silting up of reservoirs, and 
muddy floods that damage properties and roads. 
Some of these negative off-site impacts impose a 
direct financial burden on society (for example, the 
cost of sediment removal from water reservoirs or 
roads), whereas other costs are less tangible and 
difficult to quantify. This difficulty with quantifi­
cation especially applies to diffuse water pollution, 
which arises from many small sources in a catch­
ment. Pollution caused by soil erosion on a single 
field might be negligible, but the total sum of pol­
lution caused by soil erosion on all fields collec­
tively can result in significant pollution of the water 
bodies in a catchment. Its control requires soil-
conserving land management practices at a catch­
ment scale. Large-scale land degradation due to 
erosion can also be considered a cost to society, 
because less productive land is left for future 
generations.
Ecosystem Services Delivered by Soil
Besides prevention of off-site impacts caused by 
soil erosion, it is also in society's interest to com­
bat soil erosion because of the ecosystem services 
provided by soil.1 Soil erosion threatens a number 
of ecosystem services, such as carbon sequestra­
tion, nutrient cycling, water retention, food and 
fiber production at present and in the future, the 
amenity of well-managed soils and landscapes, and 
tourism [many tourists are attracted to the ancient 
terraces in the Andean landscape], and cultural 
identity (keeping a good relationship with Pacha 
Mama—Mother Earth—is an important part of the 
identity of the indigenous people in the Andes],
Soil Conservation Interventions
Soil erosion has been of interest to policy makers 
and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] for 
decades. Soil conservation practices have been 
promoted to prevent soil erosion and maintain or 
improve soil productivity. Common soil conserva­
tion practices are agricultural terraces, reforesta­
tion, and improved soil management (for example, 
use of compost or cover crops]. The results of soil 
conservation programs in developing countries are 
often discouraging, however, with limited uptake of 
soil conservation practices among farm households. 
Many economists argue that a major reason for the 
limited adoption of soil conservation practices is 
that they are not financially profitable for the farm 
households who should implement them: the 
investment costs are high, but the benefits are low, 
uncertain, and long term, as the effects on crop 
production of improving degraded land become 
apparent only after many years (Bunch 1999; Graaff 
1996], To counteract the limited short-term benefits 
of soil conservation, governments and NGOs 
intervene by providing incentives to promote these 
practices. In many cases, however, farm households 
abandon soil conservation practices as soon as soil 
conservation programs withdraw their assistance 
and incentives (Bunch 1999], This situation raises 
the question of whether it would be more
1 For more information on ecosystem functions and ser­
vices, see Groot (2006],
appropriate to develop a system of permanent sup­
port for farm households implementing soil con­
servation practices. But others argue that soil 
conservation practices should be encouraged only 
if they are financially profitable for farm house­
holds, without accompanying incentives (Bunch 
1999; Giger 1999],
Rural Poverty in the Peruvian Andos
This case study is set in the southern Andes region 
of Peru. Peru can be divided into three main 
regions: the coast, the Andes, and the Amazon 
Basin. The arid coastal area along the Pacific Ocean 
makes up around 11 percent of the total territory 
but is home to more than half of the total popula­
tion of Peru. The majority of the cities are situated 
in this coastal area, and this region's industrial 
activities are important for the national economy. 
The Andes cover a third of the Peruvian territory. 
Because of its limited accessibility, this region has 
few industrial activities. The largest part of Peruvian 
territory (58 percent] lies in the Amazon Basin, 
which is largely covered with humid rainforest and 
is sparsely populated.
Of the estimated total population of 28 million 
people, about half are considered poor and one- 
quarter are considered extremely poor. Large pro­
portions of the poor (34 percent] and extremely 
poor (56 percent] are found in the rural area of the 
Andes (Table 1] (Escobal and Validivia 2004], These 
rural poor are mainly farm households that depend 
on subsistence farming and nonfarm activities such 
as seasonal migration and handicrafts.
The Peruvian Andes region has four characteristics 
that affect rural development (Tapia 1996]:
• Inaccessibility. Because of the location, alti­
tude, slope, and physical conditions of the 
Andean region, access to and within the 
region is difficult, resulting in isolation and 
limited mobility.
• Fragility. Areas with steep slopes and light 
soil formations are susceptible to degrada­
tion. Inappropriate management and over- 
exploitation make natural resources even 
more vulnerable. Also, the economic 
structures [for example, markets and ac­
cess to credit] are fragile.
Table 1: Proportion o f  Poor People in Peru [percentage]
Region
Poor (including extremely 
poor} Extremely poor
Lima 34.1 2.8
Coast, urban 43.5 9.1
Coast, rural 62.2 24.6
Andes, urban 48.1 16.0
Andes, rural 81.2 57.4
Amazon Basin, urban 57.1 29.8
Amazon Basin, rural 71.3 43.3
Peru 53.5 23.4
Source: Escobal and Validivia 2004.
• Marginality. The region hardly benefits 
from investments in productive activities 
because of its isolation and remoteness.
• Diversity. The heterogeneity caused by alti­
tude, climate, and geological conditions 
results in many diverse ecological zones 
and a huge diversity of plants and animals. 
This ecological heterogeneity determined 
the development of various agricultural 
systems, ranging from fallow systems to 
permanent cropping systems and from 
intensive to very extensive livestock pro­
duction systems.
The Agricultural Sector in Peru
Agriculture was Peru's most productive sector until 
the 1940s. After World War II the government 
facilitated foreign investment in the mining indus­
try to meet the increasing demand for minerals. 
Industrial production took off in the 1950s but was 
dependent on the growth of mineral exports. The 
increasing employment in the coastal cities stimu­
lated the migration from the rural to the urban 
areas. Internal demand for agricultural products for 
urban consumption and agroindustrial use grew 
rapidly between 1950 and 1975, but export demand 
and rural markets for agricultural products grew 
slowly or not at all. As a result, Peru turned from a 
net exporter of agricultural products into a net 
importer in the 1980s and 1990s [Sheahan 2001], 
Thanks to the expansion of agricultural land and 
increased productivity, agricultural production and 
exports have increased since the mid-1990s. The 
increased agricultural production and exports 
consist mainly of crops such as coffee, asparagus,
and mango, which are grown in the coastal region. 
Although the production and export of Andean 
crops such as potato, maize, and barley increased as 
well, Andean producers did not benefit, because 
the prices of these crops dropped drastically. 
Whereas the incomes of agricultural producers in 
the coastal region and the Amazon Basin have 
increased since the mid-1990s, the incomes of agri­
cultural producers in the Andes have remained the 
same [Escobal and Validivia 2004],
The low productivity of agriculture in the Andes is 
mainly due to a lack of dynamic markets [Kervyn 
1988], As migration has swelled the urban popula­
tion, the large-scale, modern farms on the coast 
have increased their production to meet increasing 
urban demand. Additionally, the government 
started to import cheap food from neighboring 
countries to keep food prices low. The small-scale 
fanners in the Andes dropped out of the market 
because they lacked the capital, technology, and 
access to markets to be able to compete. Given 
their low productivity, high transportation costs, 
and high risks, it is not profitable for them to sell 
their products to urban markets.
The general sense about peasant economies in 
developing countries is that they are tied to the 
wider political economy. It is assumed that the 
peasantry provides not only cheap food to the 
urban economy, but also cheap labor. This notion 
of functional dualism does not apply, however, to 
the peasant economy of Peru. Most of the agricul­
tural products of small-scale farmers in the Andes 
are traded in rural markets, not in urban markets. 
Barter is still common in the remote rural areas. 
The peasantry does not supply cheap labor to
coastal urban areas either, because these areas have 
sufficient labor available owing to previous high 
migration and in fact now have high unemploy­
ment. Niekerk [1994] depicted the rural economy in 
the Andes as a situation in which the peasantry 
limps along with low-productivity agriculture and 
seasonal migration to rural towns within the Andes.
Soil Conservation in the Andes
Soil erosion is considered among the most serious 
environmental problems throughout the Andes. It 
is assumed that 57 percent of the land in the 
Andes is affected by moderate to severe erosion 
[Felipe-Morales 1993], resulting in low agricultural 
productivity. Ironically, the Andes have a long his­
tory of terracing. Before the Spanish conquest in 
1532, indigenous societies built terraces to support 
large populations. During the empire of the Incas 
[between 1250 and 1532], terracing was organized as 
part of a systematic policy of land improvement 
and food security. Inhabitants of the Inca Empire 
were compelled to pay taxes in the form of labor, 
which contributed to the construction of many 
terraces. These terraces facilitated agriculture on 
steep slopes and the modification of the micro­
climate in order to create favorable conditions for 
crops such as maize and tuber crops. It is estimated 
that 75 percent of these ancient terraces, especially 
the non-irrigated terraces, are now abandoned 
[Treacy 1998], The region's irregular rainfall makes 
labor and seed investment too risky given the low 
crop prices obtained, so agricultural land use has 
shifted from predominantly cultivation of crops 
toward mixed farming (livestock keeping and culti­
vation of crops]. The resulting neglect and use of 
terraces to graze cattle and sheep lead to erosion 
and collapse of walls (Inbar and Llerena 2000], 
Attempts have been made to rehabilitate these ter­
races, but doing so is difficult because traditional 
materials and workmanship have changed, as has 
the indigenous society. In the Andean economy, 
crop production has gone from being the main 
activity to just one of many income strategies of 
farm households. Also, communities are now more 
fragmented and heterogeneous, with weakened 
traditional authorities and abandoned traditional 
systems of land management (Rodriguez and 
Nickails 2002],
Nevertheless, soil conservation practices such as 
terraces are successful in reducing soil erosion and 
improving cropping conditions (Posthumus 2005],
Once installed, terraces also result in significant 
labor savings if manual tillage is applied. Taking into 
account the investment costs, however, terraces are 
only profitable if farmers take advantage of the 
improved cropping conditions by growing a crop 
with a high commercial value or by increasing pro­
duction by growing two crops a year. Despite the 
potential benefits of terraces, the desirability of 
these benefits for a farm household depends on the 
functioning of factor and output markets. Farm 
households are not motivated to install terraces 
when they cannot convert the potential benefits 
into cash because of a lack of markets for agricul­
tural produce. Although farm households in the 
Andes depend on agricultural production for their 
food consumption, they rely on nonfarm activities 
to generate income for meeting their other con­
sumption needs. Therefore, it is financially more 
profitable for a farm household to grow crops on 
eroding soil than to invest in soil conservation 
practices such as terraces (Yanggen et al. 2002], 
Motivating farm households to implement terraces 
requires attaching immediate benefits to them. Such 
benefits could be created by increasing the value of 
agricultural production on terraces, providing 
other incentives linked with soil conservation, or 
both.
Policy Issues
Use of Incentives in Natural Resource 
Management
Incentives are commonly used in natural resource 
management. The aim of sustainable natural 
resource management is to use natural resources in 
such a way that production is adequate for present 
needs [short-term private objective], ecosystem 
services are maintained (short-term social objective], 
and the productive capacity is maintained for 
future use [long-term social objective]. These objec­
tives can conflict when present use jeopardizes the 
future use of the natural resource, when private 
use limits public use, or the other way around. In 
the case of soil, present agricultural practices can 
induce soil erosion, jeopardizing future soil fertility 
and causing negative off-site impacts that impose 
costs on society. Incentives play a role in equating 
private and social objectives if they conflict. If 
interventions favor public use at the expense of 
private use, incentives can be used to fund the 
costs [for example, the investment costs of soil
conservation practices] to the private user [the 
farmer]. If the private user benefits from the 
resource at a cost to society or to future use, 
however, disincentives like taxes or legislation 
might be more appropriate. In the first case, the 
beneficiary pays; in the second case, the polluter. 
The polluter-pays principle is mainly applied in 
developed countries [for example, through an eco- 
tax] and is considered inappropriate for developing 
countries, because subsistence farm households 
would not be able to afford these taxes. Further­
more, because of the diffuse nature of soil erosion, 
it can be difficult to trace the source of soil ero­
sion that is causing negative off-site impacts.
Arguments against and in Favor of Using 
Incentives for Soil Conservation
Soil erosion is an externality of agriculture, mean­
ing that the cost of soil erosion is not included in 
the price of agricultural produce. The implementa­
tion costs of soil conservation practices, however, 
are borne by the farmer. As already explained, the 
profitability of soil conservation practices for farm 
households is often limited because of the high 
investment costs. Soil conservation programs in 
developing countries often provide direct incentives 
[such as food, money, fertilizers, or tools] to 
resource-poor farm households to reduce or com­
pensate for implementation costs. The use of incen­
tives is often justified by the argument that subsis­
tence farm households are too poor to make huge 
investments and that society benefits from these 
investments as well. The use of direct incentives, 
however, has been challenged because of unin­
tended side-effects [Giger 1999], In some cases, 
farm households were more interested in the incen­
tives than in the technologies. As a result, farm 
households did not develop ownership of the soil 
conservation practices and abandoned them as soon 
as the funding ended and the project withdrew its 
assistance. Furthermore, it is argued that the incen­
tives create a paternalistic dependency that makes a 
farm household believe it is unable to implement 
soil conservation practices without external help 
(Bunch 1999], Soil conservation projects are also 
accused of using direct incentives to achieve quick 
results, without paying attention to long-term 
impact.
Payments tor Environmental Services
More recently attention has been given to pay­
ments for environmental services [PES], as society
realizes that ecosystems and the services they pro­
vide are under threat owing to increasing human 
pressure. This emerging scarcity makes these envi­
ronmental services potentially subject to trade. 
Payment schemes and markets are now emerging 
for ecosystem services in order to reward the 
communities, often rural, that allow for the pro­
vision of these services. In developing countries 
there is an increasing interest in PES because it is 
hoped that these schemes will have a positive effect 
on poverty alleviation. Most PES schemes so far 
have been state run, focusing on catchment man­
agement or forest conservation. These PES schemes 
resemble the traditional public subsidy schemes for 
soil protection, but more emphasis is now put on 
monitoring the compliance of recipients of the 
payments. Although PES schemes are promising 
methods for making private and public use of 
natural resources consistent, implementing these 
schemes is difficult: defining the beneficiaries, 
determining the amount of payments, and estab­
lishing rules for compliance are difficult ethical 
issues in a rural development context. PES are seen 
as a reward to poor farm households who take care 
of the environment and "produce" environmental 
services. From an efficiency point of view, however, 
only those who constitute a threat to environ­
mental services provision should be paid (Wunder 
2005], Thus in some cases the rural poor do not 
benefit from PES at all.
Increasing the Value of Soil Conservation 
for Farm Households
In an ideal situation, soil conservation practices 
should be incentives in themselves by providing 
benefits to the farm household. Soil conservation 
practices should not be seen as a goal but be 
incorporated in the rural livelihood strategies and 
ecosystem services. At present, agricultural produc­
tion is not generating enough income for farm 
households to meet their consumption needs. The 
commonly grown crops (potato, maize, and barley] 
have a low value because these crops are imported 
for low prices. Farm households would find ter­
races more financially attractive if they grew crops 
with a higher commercial value, such as fruits or 
herbs. Yet because of the high risk of crop failure 
(due to unreliable climate, pests, and diseases] and 
high transportation costs, agricultural production 
in the Andes is not competitive. Farm households 
are competitive in growing typical Andean crops 
such as quinoa, tarwi, oca, ulluco, and maca, but
marketing channels for these Andean crops are 
poorly developed.
Stakeholders
The main stakeholders in soil conservation are the 
users of the land [the farm households] and society. 
Furthermore there are many NGOs—large and 
small—that seek to improve rural livelihoods in 
the Andes. Some of these NGOs [such as Arariwa, 
Masai, and Cusichaca Trust] address soil conserva­
tion, but normally it is a minor component of their 
programs. For the purpose of this case study, two 
government programs are considered because these 
are the most prominent soil conservation projects 
in the southern Andes in Peru.
Farm Households
In the Andes, most farm households look for 
income opportunities besides agricultural produc­
tion, because the revenues from agriculture are not 
sufficient to meet their consumption needs. About 
half of the net income of Peruvian farm households 
originates from activities other than farming 
[Escobal 2001], Nevertheless, agricultural produc­
tion remains important for the farm household for 
food consumption. Farm households try to mini­
mize variation in production, income, and expendi­
ture—in other words, to minimize risk. Risks are 
taken (for instance, temporal migration to find off- 
farm employment] once the minimum income is 
assured (Kervyn 1988], Because the aim of agricul­
tural production is mainly to meet minimum 
household consumption needs, Andean farm 
households are normally not very responsive to 
markets for agricultural produce. Instead of aiming 
for profit maximization in agriculture, farm house­
holds minimize the amount of labor allocated to 
agriculture (subject to the constraint of meeting 
the basic consumption needs] in order to pursue 
nonfarm income-generating activities. Nevertheless, 
the agricultural calendar dictates when labor is allo­
cated to the different farming and nonfarming 
activities (Figueroa 1989],
Society
As already argued, society also has a stake in soil 
conservation that encourages the delivery of 
certain environmental services and reduces negative 
off-site impacts. Peruvian society is heterogeneous 
in terms of ethnic groups, culture, wealth, and
political power (Sheahan 2001], Spanish descendents 
in the coastal region still control most of the coun­
try's wealth and political power, whereas indigenous 
Peruvians in the rural Andes make up the majority 
of the poor. The Gini coefficient for Peru is 0.498, 
indicating that income is unequally divided within 
the society [World Bank 2005], Causes of this 
inequality are, among other things, unequal access 
between urban and rural populations to education 
and the lack of economic and political attention to 
the indigenous people (Sheahan 2001],
Soil Conservation Programs in Peru
The two most important soil conservation pro­
grams in the Southern Andes are PRO- 
NAMACHCS (Programa Nacional de Manejo de 
Cuencas Hidrograficas y de Conservacion de 
Suelos] and MARENASS (Manejo de Recursos 
Naturales en la Sierra Sur ]. Table 2 summarizes the 
main differences between these two programs.
The Peruvian government became increasingly 
aware of the problems with deforestation and soil 
erosion in the early 1980s. The government pro­
gram PRONAMACHCS was launched in 1981 with 
the main objective of promoting sustainable man­
agement of natural resources in the Andes. PRO­
NAMACHCS is the most important program 
promoting soil conservation practices like terraces, 
infiltration ditches, and reforestation. The program 
started with a food-for-work approach but now 
provides tools to farmers as an incentive for the 
implementation of soil conservation practices. Ac­
cording to PRONAMACHCS, lack of knowledge is 
the principal restriction stopping farmers from 
implementing soil conservation practices. Tech­
nology transfer is therefore considered to be the 
solution to promote soil conservation. By involving 
the farmers in the soil conservation activities, the 
program allows farmers to learn how to implement 
these practices and at the same time to observe the 
impacts. PRONAMACHCS organizes activities to 
implement soil conservation practices in a com­
munity once a week, under the direction of a tech­
nical engineer. In 2000 PRONAMACHCS worked 
in 866 watersheds in the Peruvian Andes and was 
estimated to reach 232,772 households. The area 
with soil conservation practices was estimated at 
38,920 hectares, with the majority of this area 
consisting of terraces. PRONAMACHCS applies a 
top-down approach where the technical engineer is 
responsible for deciding on the type and location
Table 2 : Main Distinguishing Features o f  P R O N A M A C H C Sa n dM A R EN A SS  
Feature PRONAMACHCS MARENASS
Aim Natural resource management, 
soil conservation
Improvement of rural livelihoods, soil 
conservation incorporated into 
technology package
Approach Top-down Grass-roots level
Duration of program 20 years 4 years
Level of intervention Andes Pilot project in southern Andes
Operation Activities once a week, directed 
by technical staff
Frequency and type of activities 
decided by participants
Who decides on location 
and type of soil 
conservation practices
Technical staff Participants
Extension Knowledge transfer from 
technical staff to participants
Farmer-to-farmer extension, farm 
visits
Incentives Tools for work Farmer competitions, awards [money]
of soil conservation practices. This approach results 
in catchment management plans and widespread 
implementation of soil conservation practices, espe­
cially on degraded soils in the upper parts of the 
catchments. Because PRONAMACHCS takes the 
lead in implementation, some farm households 
develop little ownership of the soil conservation 
practices and abandon some of them.
In 1998 the Peruvian government launched the pilot 
program MARENASS. MARENASS works in a 
community over a four-year period. The program's 
main objective is to improve rural livelihoods by 
facilitating a range of activities such as improve­
ment of grassland, soil conservation, house 
improvement, horticulture, construction of sanitary 
facilities, animal breeding, construction of corrals, 
production of handicrafts, public works at the 
community level, and improvement of community 
dynamics. The distinctive feature of the program is
its participatory, demand-driven approach. Farmer 
competitions are organized to motivate participants 
to undertake new activities. At the community 
level, farm households compete in their perfor­
mance and uptake of new practices. At district 
level, communities compete against each other as 
well. Cash awards can be won at each competition. 
The knowledge about new technologies is trans­
ferred through farmer-to-farmer extension 
methods and is driven by community demand. In 
total, MARENASS has worked in 360 communities, 
reaching about 33,000 households [Zutter 2004). 
Farm households also decide themselves on the 
type and location of soil conservation practices 
they will implement, if any. Although this approach 
has resulted in an increased sense of ownership of 
the soil conservation practices among farm house­
holds, implementation has been limited and terraces 
have been installed solely on the more productive 
soils, in order to intensify agricultural production,
rather than preventing soil erosion in the catch­
ments. The program's impact on controlling soil 
erosion is therefore disputable.
Policy Options
Although programs are important instruments in 
the initial adoption of soil conservation practices, 
whether farm households continue to use these 
practices is influenced by market and policy-related 
factors. A farm household will only implement and 
maintain soil conservation practices if it provides 
sufficient permanent benefits. This section presents 
several policy measures to promote soil conserva­
tion representing different views on the issue of 
soil erosion and rural poverty in the Andes. These 
measures are not exclusive and could be combined 
into a national policy for natural resource 
management.
Policy M easure  1: E m pow erm en t of Farm 
H o useho lds th ro u g h  Participatory  
A pproaches
Past soil conservation programs have seen farm 
households as part of the problem rather than the 
solution. Knowledge transfer was considered to be 
the solution to persuade ignorant farm households 
to adopt the "right" technologies developed on 
experimental farms. If these approaches failed to 
consider the needs and priorities of farm house­
holds, however, a lack of ownership became an 
important constraining factor for continued adop­
tion of soil conservation practices. Participatory 
approaches such as MARENASS aim to address the 
problems and interests of farm households rather 
than imposing the program objectives on partici­
pants. Participatory programs encourage farm 
households to take charge of solving their prob­
lems. Active farmer participation is central to this 
approach, and indigenous knowledge, experimenta­
tion, and adaptation are seen as crucial to develop­
ing appropriate practices that address farm house­
holds' needs and conserve natural resources in a 
way that is compatible with their farming systems 
(Kessler 2006). Soil conservation might receive less 
attention in participatory programs, however, 
because other more urgent needs of farm house­
holds (such as access to education, health care, or 
credit) are likely to be prioritized.
Policy Measure 2: Provide Permanent 
Support for Soil Conservation
Achieving the full benefits of soil conservation 
interventions often takes longer than the lifespan 
of a soil conservation project. Therefore, a soil 
conservation project should be embedded in an 
ongoing national or regional program that facili­
tates the maintenance and implementation of soil 
conservation practices after project closure (Bodnar 
2005; Kessler 2006). For example, large numbers 
of terraces were constructed during the Inca 
Empire in order to enhance the government policy 
of food security. Because terracing was considered 
important for the sustenance of society, inhabitants 
were forced to supply labor for a limited period as 
a national service. Likewise, if a current society (or 
government) prioritizes soil conservation in 
national development plans, a permanent support 
system should be developed to promote soil con­
servation. The national program PRONAMACHCS 
could be continued and improved, whereby ter­
racing would be considered a form of public work 
(like road construction), carried out by farm 
households but paid for by the government. Per­
manent government support for soil conservation 
is controversial, however, as soil conservation prac­
tices are implemented on private or communal land 
and not everyone will have access to or directly 
benefit from it (in contrast to roads).
Policy Measure 3: Payments for 
Environmental Services
As discussed earlier, there is an increasing interest 
in using PES schemes in natural resource manage­
ment. Compensation for environmental services 
revalues the role of rural spaces and communities 
within society. PES are based on the principle that 
people who benefit from environmental services 
should compensate those who make it possible to 
generate these services. Subsidies or transfer pay­
ments (the transfer of funds between buyer and 
seller through intermediaries) can be given to the 
provider of environmental services as remuneration 
for specific actions or practices. Implementation of 
these schemes, however, is not always straight­
forward. It is difficult to quantify the services pro­
vided and their value in monetary terms for benefi­
ciaries. Furthermore, ensuring that the money is 
spent properly on environmental stewardship can 
be even more difficult (Wunder 2005). In the case 
of soil erosion, negative off-site impacts will be
prevented only if the majority of the land users in 
the catchment apply soil conservation practices. 
Even then, soil erosion might still occur owing to 
natural events that are beyond human control 
(such as extreme rainfall].
Policy Measure 4: Improvement of 
Infrastructure
Improvement of infrastructure is a vital component 
in the development of remote rural areas. Infra­
structure investment can reduce transaction costs 
and improve market integration, which facilitates 
rural development (Escobal 2005], Improved access 
to markets for food crops can stimulate farmers to 
invest more in agriculture in order to increase this 
production. Investment in soil conservation prac­
tices such as terraces becomes financially attractive 
when these terraces enable the production of cash 
crops on sloping or marginal land. Adoption of 
such practices is only likely to happen, however, 
when agriculture is the main livelihood strategy for 
farm households. Improved infrastructure would 
also improve access to off-farm labor markets, and 
in this case, farm households would turn to off- 
farm activities and seasonal migration as their main 
livelihood strategies and decrease their investments 
of labor and capital in agriculture. The incentive to 
invest in soil conservation thus declines as farm 
households' dependence on agriculture for their 
livelihoods decreases (Posthumus 2005],
Policy M easure  5: P rom otion  of A ndean  
C rops
Another way to improve market integration and 
enhance agricultural production is by promoting 
the consumption and export of typical Andean 
crops. This strategy would require investments in 
the entire food chain but would improve the eco­
nomic position of farm households in the Andes. 
The marketing of Andean crops could be strength­
ened by incorporating environmental attributes, 
such as soil conservation, into the production 
process through certification. Certification and 
labeling of agricultural products is another com­
pensation mechanism to reward environmental ser­
vices (see policy measure 3], This mechanism 
assumes that consumers are willing to pay more for 
products using environmentally friendly production 
processes (Rosa et al. 2003], Vertical marketing 
systems in particular (in contrast to conventional 
market channels] are likely to be beneficial for soil
conservation. Vertical market channels are coordi­
nated systems where members aim at common 
goals in order to achieve greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in market functions such as those 
related to improving quality, marketing high-quality 
products, delivering services, branding, and
increasing market power. Vertical marketing sys­
tems stimulate long-term planning horizons for 
farm households, allowing stable market relation­
ships and a higher commitment to soil conserva­
tion. Coordination of marketing functions makes 
vertical marketing systems more able to stimulate 
and maintain a common marketing policy, which is 
particularly important for the production and 
marketing of environmentally friendly products 
(Castano 2001], In such a system, agricultural 
products can be promoted (among consumers as 
well as producers] as having limited environmental 
externalities, such as soil erosion.
Assignment
Your assignment is to design a policy for natural 
resource protection in the Peruvian Andes, focus­
ing on soil conservation in particular, within a rural 
development strategy.
Additional Readings
All recommended readings are available on the 
Internet.
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